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I. INTRODUCTION

Historians of economics and philosophy have noted Georg Wilhelm
Fredrich Hegel's debt to Adam Smith and have suggested that Hegel's
analysis of civil society rests on a Smithian foundation. Laurence Dickey
recognized that "Hegel's interest in the Scots coincided with the late
eighteenth-century German interest in the relationship between socioeconomic processes in history and the development of civil institutions"
(Dickey 1987, p. 194). Georg Lukacs emphasized that "it is highly probable
that the study of Adam Smith was a turning-point in Hegel's evolution"
(Lukacs 1976, p. 172). In his study of The Formation of the Economic
Thought of Karl Marx, Ernest Mandel maintained that Marx discovered
political economy and its importance to philosophy in his reading of Hegel.
Says Mandel:
[Hegel] had been profoundly affected in his youth by economic
studies, in particular by the work of Adam Smith; Marx saw the
Hegelian system as a veritable philosophy oflabor. [Quoting Pierre
Naville:] "When he read the Phenomenology of Mind, the Philosophy of Right, and even the Science of Logic, Marx thus not only
discovered Hegel but already, through him, was aware of that part
of classical political economy which was assimilated and translated
into philosophical terms in Hegel's work; so that Marx would not
have gone into his systematic criticism of civil society and the state
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accor.ding to Hegel. if he had not found in the latter's writings
certam elements whl~h ~ere still live, such as the theory of needs,
the theory of appropnatlOn, or the analysis of the division of labor"
(Mandel 1971, pp. 11-12).
Hegel's Jena Lec.tures of 1~03-1806, Jenenser Realphilosoplzie I and II,
r~v~al that he was mdeed usmg Smith's Wealth of Nations in a manner
slI~llar to Marx's later use of it in the Economic and Philosophic MalluSC':lptS.1 Accordin~ to Z. A. Pelczynski, in the 1805-1806 Lectures, "Hegel
tne~ hard to theonze, but although he describes the effects of industrial
society on human powers in vivid terms reminiscent of Marx, he is not yet
~ble to produce a systematic theory of civil society, still less to integrate it
mto a more comprehensive social and political philosophy" (Pelczynski
1984, p. 5).
Yet that Smith's findings continued to influence Hegel's later writings, if
less obviously so, is recognized both by Paul Charnley and by Shlomo
Avineri. Avineri comments:
Mechanization and industrialization are ... the necessary consequences of civil society. Thus civil society reaches its apex - and it
is here that Hegel integrates the Smithian model of a free market
into his philosophical system, by transforming Smith's 'hidden
hand' into dialectical reason working in civil society, unbeknownst
to its own members. Self-interest and self-assertion are the motives
of activity in civil society; but these can be realized by the individual
only through inter-action with others and recognition by them. The
mutual dependence of all on all is inherent in every individual's
self-oriented action ... AdaJil Smith is thus aufgehoben - both preserved and transcended-into the Hegelian system (Avineri 1972,
pp. 146-47; see also Charnley 1965, pp. 252-55).
Mandel also confirms Smith'S continuing influence on Hegel in his
review of certain elements of the economic content of Hegel's philosophical writings. Hegel's philosophy of labor is introduced in his System of
Ethical Life (System der Sittlichkeit), developed to its fullest extent in the
J ena Lectures and in the Phenomenology of Mind, then defended critically
in the Philosophy of Right and the Science of Logic. The relationship

fi~'

a~tcr
Gcr~an
~It~

1. We know that Smith'S Wealth of Nations was translated into '.ierman soon
it
'ppe"ed. "Ooe ,o\ume of ,he
GO'm'o
(by T. F. SdullO') ",me. out m ,he
n
same year as the Wealth of Nations itself. Before the (18th) century closed, thiS
translation had passed through three editions; meanwhile a secon.d much better tra?slal1o ,
which the popular philosopher Christian Garbe [sic) brought out In 1786 had met
grcat
success, (Palyi 1928, p.184). It was Garve's 1794-1796 translation which Hegcl studied In Jena

,,,,,\"'00

and cited in his lectures, Jenenser Realphi/osophie I and /I.
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between human need and labor is first touched upon in his System ofEthical
Life. In his mature works, this becomes "a real dialectic between need and
labor and thus [Hegel] arrived at a twofold definition of labor as alienating
and alienated" (Mandel 1976, p. 155). Moreover, this alienation expands
into the alienation of whole economic classes, the contradictions between
the extremes of poverty and wealth that is characteristic of modern industrial nations. 2 Thus though Hegel's debt to Smith is most apparent in his
early Jena Lectures, it is fair to conclude that Smith's original influence on
Hegel is "preserved and transcended" in the mature Hegelian system.
Indeed, Riedel claims that "Hegel's assimilation of the most advanced
theories of political economy, as found in the classical British thinkers from
James Steuart to Adam Smith and in the Philosophy of Right of 1821 David
Ricardo, had no parallel in German idealistic philosophy" (Riedel 1984, p.
108). How Hegel's understanding of Smith developed and how he transformed Smith's thought is central to both an understanding of Hegel's
philosophical writing and an appreciation of the extent of Adam Smith's
influence outside of Great Britain and outside of economics. Discussion
here investigates Hegel's adoption of Smith's thought in the early Jena
Lectures and in the later Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Right.
Hegel's first systematic encounter with political economy was his study of
Sir James Steuart's Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy.3 As a
result of his reading of Steuart, Hegel saw the problem of personal
fragmentation, alienation, less in terms of religious structures and more in
terms of economic phenomena. Raymond Plant, drawing on the research
of Paul Chamley, concludes that Hegel derived three major insights from
his reading of Steuart's Inquiry. "First, there was the beginnings of a
philosophy of history which enabled him to take up a far more positive
attitude towards the development of modern society" (Plant 1980, p. 64).
Thus Hegel concluded that the dialectic had relevance beyond logical
method, for it was the key to understanding historical processes. For Hegel,
history moves dialectically. Next, "from Steuart's theory of the statesman,
he derived a very distinctive theory about the role of the state vis-a-vis
modern commercial society" (ibid.). Yet, as we shall see, Hegel also found
2. E. Mandel summarizes Hegel's economics and their influence on the development of
Marx's thought in Chapter 10 of his The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx.
Others, in addition to Avineri and Plant, who have recognized Marx's debt to Hegel include
Roman Rosdolsky (in the preface to his The Making ofMarx's "Capital'), Martin Nicolaus (in
his foreword to Gmndrisse), and R. P. Bellamy (in his article "Hegelianism" in The New
Pa/grave). In contrast, Herbert Marcuse (in his Reason and Revolution) fails to see any
Smithian influence.
3. Laurence Dickey summarized his own reasons "why James Steuart's views on political
economy found such a receptive audience" (Dickey 1987, p.196; see also pp.197 -99). Michael
Perelman suggests that Steuart's discussion of price theory may have contributed to Hegel's
dialectical thinking.
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Smit~'s laiss~z-faire dictums appropriate. Finally, of particular importance
to thIS study IS Hegel's adoption of Steuart's "idea that the development of
the exchange economy caused an increase in human freedom and self~ev~~o~~ent, but which at the same time yields its own forms of integratIOn (.IbId.). Elsewhere Plant notes that reading Steuart led Hegel to
reconsIder the problem of personal fragmentation as a consequence of
changes in the economic structure rather than religious structures (Plant
1983, p. 23). Furthermore, Dickey concludes that "it is perfectly possible
and even probable that Hegel read Smith and Steuart as complements to
each other rather than _ as the conventional view would have it - as spokesmen for two different antithetical interpretations of the purposes of'political economy'" (Dickey 1987, p. 199).
Changes in the structure of the economy were also the focus of another
writer of the Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816). Dickey
argues that the influence of this Scottish writer is clear. Yet even here,
Smith's thought was at work. Without entangling ourselves in the controversy surrounding Smith's charges of plagiarism, let us merely quote c.R.
Fay's comment that "Ferguson, as philosopher, and Millar, as lawyer,
looked with interest over the fence at the new plant of political economy,
which Adam Smith was raising. By no means economists themselves ... they
drew on it for occasional illustration" (Fay 1956, p. 91).4 Thus Smith's
influence on Hegel was, at first, indirect, coming through the writings of
Ferguson. While, "the human consequences of the growing differentiation
offunction and the development of commercial society was not the primary
focus of the Scottish historians .. .it did ... strike a deep chord. among the
German" philosophers (Plant 1983, p. 22). Not only did Hegel draw on
Ferguson'swork, but, as Ferguson himself had done, Hegel
Smith for a better, deeper understanding of modern commercial, mdustnal

tur.ne~ toAd~m

society.
II. SMITHIAN ROOTS IN HEGEL'S EARLY WRITINGS

Hegel sought to develop a complete philosophical system. Thus he faced
the problem of recoucilin g the world of concrete reahty and the Ideal world
of consciousness, in Hegel's terms the realm of Nature and the realm of
Spiri t. These are two separa te, parallel, and equivalent worlds. While these

. .
h
t be reconciled and the burden
worlds are separate and dlstmct, yet t ey mus
.
W R S t (1937 pp 118-20 Rae(1895,
by '33'
\h;
first
in
4. Smith's charges of plagiarism
pp. 64-65, and most definitively by ~lOer (1965), P.r· - . 67-69. Stewart mentioned
. I SmtIh
d t (1793,
Adampp.
Ferguson
Dugald Stewart's Biographical MemOlfofAdam
) as the aut h or wh0
no names, but Bonar (1932, pp. 68-69) slOg c ou
provoked Smith to issue the charge.

ar~exammed

3~~

char~e

~ppeared
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of that reconciliation falls on Spirit. In his J ena Lectures, this reconciliation
takes two forms: language and labor. Through language, the "name-giving
power," Spirit takes Nature into its possession and, thus "nature is no longer
a realm of images internally suspended, having no being. Rather it is the
realm of names" (Hegel 1983, p. 89-90).
Adam Smith's opening sentence reveals the role that labor plays in the
reconciliation of what Hegel calls Nature and Spirit for "the annual labour
of every nation is the fund which originally supplies itwith all the necessaries
and conveniences of life which it annually consumes" (Smith 1776, p. lvii).
Through labor, Spirit wills the transformation of Nature; the ego moves
from ~ passive to an active state molding Nature, subjecting Nature to man's
will. Hegel turned to Adam Smith to better comprehend the progressive
development of the economy, "civil society," and to better understand the
nature oflabor, reconciler of Spirit and Nature, in the most advanced center
of civil society, Great Britain.
Karl Marx, who was not aware of Hegel's Jena Lectures, is particularly
critical of Hegel's comprehension of the multiple roles played by labor.
What Marx does recognize is the influence of the classical economists on
Hegel's later work: "Hegel'sstandpoint is that of modern political economy.
He grasps labor as the essence of man - as man's essence in the act of proving
itself: he sees only the positive, not the negative side oflabor. Labor is man's
coming-to-be for himseifwith alienation, or as alienated man" (Marx 1844, p.
177). Because Marxwas unaware of Hegel's Jena Lectures, this observation
is mistaken, for there Hegel sees both the positive and the negative side of
labor. Hegel drew his grasp of "the positive side of labor" from Smith's
book,5 In Smith, the expansion of production is dependent upon, driven by
the division and specialization oflabor. "It is the great multiplication of the
productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of
labour, which occasions in a well-governed society, ... universalopulence ... "
(Smith 1776, p. 11). His famous pin factory example illustrates the
expansionary effects of the division of labor. Not only does the division of
labor expand output, but it changes the nature of the work performed by the
laborer: "In the way in which [pin making] is now carried on, not only the
whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches,
of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades" (ibid., p. 4). Smith
goes on to describe "about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some
5. Interestingly, both Smith and Hegel employ a quasi·historical approach when examining the impact oflabor on early social and economic development. The difference here is that
Smith is focusing on the way that labor produces both goods and new social relationshipsthe three economic classes, with their separate claims to a share of the value of those goods.
On the other hand, Hegel maintained that human need and the resulting consumption
created shortages, forcing man to labor, and laboring changed both social relationships and
human nature.
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manuf~ctories, are all performed by distinct hands" (ibid.).

To Illustrate how the specialization and division of labor increases
?roductivity, Hegel cites Smith's pin factory example in two different places
I~ ~h~ lena Lectures. First, in his 1803-1804 Lectures, he says that "the
dlVlSwn of labor increases the mass of manufactured [objects]; eighteen
men work in an English pin factory .... Each has a specific part of the work
to do and only that. A single man would perhaps not make 20, could not
even make one; those eighteen jobs divided among ten men produce 4000
per day. But from the work of those ten in a group of eighteen there would
[come] 48000" (Hegel 1979, p. 248).6 And, in his Lectures of 1805-1806, we
find this brief marginal note: "Universal labor, division of labor, [Iabor-]
saving. Ten men can make as many pins as a hundred" (Hegel 1983, p. 121).
For Smith and Hegel, the division of labor not only increases output, bu t
has additional positive and negative consequences for man. In hisPhiiosophy of Right, we find Hegel's mature statement of the causes and consequences of the division of labor:
The universal and objective element in work, on the other hand,
lies in the abstracting process which effects the subdivision of needs
and means and thereby eo ipso subdivides production and brings
the division of labour. By this division, the work of the individual
becomes less complex, and consequently his skill at his section of
the job increases, like his output. At the same time, this abstraction
on one man's skills and means of production from another's
completes and makes necessary everywhere th~ depen~ence. of
men on one another and their reciprocal relation In the satIsfactIOn
of their other needs. Further, the abstraction of one man's
production from another's makes work more and more .mec?an~
cal, until finally man is able to step aside and install machmes In hls
place (Hegel 1942, 198).7
How Hegel arrived at this position can be traced back to his treatment of
Smith's analysis as it first developed in Hegel's Jena Lectures. ~n ~he
positive side, the division of labor draws men tog~ther, it ~s the mediatIOn
through which man relates to his fellow men. Smlth descnbes the produc.
I'
CC' "The particularization of
6. Avineri translates this passage. In t~e fol oWI~g mann fa~ture 18 eople work at the
labour multiplies the mass of productJo~; In an Enghsh ~an~ide of ;he ;ork to perform; a
production of a needle; each has a particular and exclUSive "(A' . 1972 P 93)
single person could not produce 120 needles, ev~n nhot ?~e'''D I vlvnecrplcter Gr~cn;wcgen
.,
h "d' . .
f labour" III r, e new ra gra ,
7. In hiS article on t e IVlslon a
.
s the division of labour makcs
maintains that "Hegel was one ?f the first t.o pOint ou~~ha~~de and install machines in his
"work more and more mechamcal, ... man IS able tO sb PB bb gc Ure and dcveloped by
place," a feature of the process subsequently note d y a a ,
'
Marx (Groenewegen 1987,1, p. 902).

t
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tion of a coarse, rough woolen coat which "is the produce of the joint labour
of a great multitude of workmen ... " to illustrate the point (Smith 1776, p.
11). Smith concluded that "when the division of labour has been thoroughly
introduced, the produce of a man's own labour can supply but a very small
part of his occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by
the produce of other men's labour ..." (ibid., p. 259). In Hegel, this concept
of labor as mediator, relating man to his fellow men, is expressed in these
terms: "Labor is of all and for all, and the enjoyment [of its fruits] is
enjoyment by all. Each [one] serves the other and provides help. Only here
does the individual have existence, as individual" (Hegel 1983, p. 120).
Even though the division of labor performs this positive, mediating
function, it has important negative aspects as well, because "not only the
whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches,
of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades." This increasing
degree of specialization makes work more and more abstract. Within
Smith's pin factory, no single worker produces pins, instead "the important
business of making a pin is ... divided into about eighteen distinct operations,
which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands" (Smith
1776, p. 4) .
. Like his German contemporaries, Hegel was familiar with the work of
the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Hegel's analysis of the increasingly abstract nature of work in a manufacturing environment shows
insights which most probably derived, either directly or through the writings
ofthe other Scottish writers, from Smith's pin factory example in the Wealth
of Nations. Hegel argued that
since work is performed only [to satisfy] the need as abstract beingfor-itself, the working becomes abstract as well ... Each individual
because he is an individual here, labors for a need. Yet the content
of his labor goes beyond his need; he labors for the needs of many,
and so does everyone. Each satisfies the needs of many, and the
satisfaction of one's own particular needs is the labor of many
others. Since his labor is abstract in this way, he behaves as an
abstract I - according to the mode of thinghood - not as an allencompassing Spirit, rich in content, ruling a broad range and
being master of it (Hegel 1983, p. 121).
Smith himself was well aware of the dehumanizing consequences of
modern factory work. The division and specialization oflabor in the factory
took a terrible toll on the humanity of the workers. The mind-numbing
repetition of "a few simple operations, frequently one or two" renders the
worker "as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to
become" (Smith 1776, p. 734). Thus the worker's "dexterity at his own
particular trade seems ... to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual,

4Iitrt3li'H'=WywrrnnV"mrn mr.:nor
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social, and ma~~ial virtues" (i?id., 735~. So great was this evil that governmen~ o~gh.t to take. s?~e paIns to relIeve it" (ibid.). For Smith, then, the
speclall~atIOn an.d dIVISion of labor is a two-sided process- increasing the
pr?ductIOn of thIngs, while debilitating the producer, the worker. It is on
thiS very point that Hegel made his first explicit citation of Adam Smith's
Wealth of Nations. In his 1803-04 Lectures, Hegel pointed out not only the
abstractness of the work within the factory, but its general dehumanizing
conse~uences as well. Much of the following quote is Hegel's paraphrasing
of SmIth's commentary on the alienation of the worker.
The division of labor increases the mass of manufactured [Objects]
[etc. quoted above] .... But in the same ratio that the number (of
objects] produced rises, the value of labor falls; the labor becomes
that much deader, it becomes machine work, the skill of the single
laborer is infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the faclory
laborer is impoverished to the last extreme of dullness; and the
coherence of the singular kind of labor with the whole infinite mass
of needs is quite unsurveyable (Hegel 1979, p. 248).8
In his 1805-1806 Lectures, Hegel again considered the dehumanizing
effects of the specialization and division of labor, this time emphasizing that
such abstract work turns the worker into an abstraction: 9 "Man's labor itself
becomes entirely mechanical, belonging to a many-sided determinacy. But
the more abstract [his labor] becomes, the more he himself is mere abstract
activity" (Hegel 1983, p. 121). Thus for Hegel, within the modern factory,
"Labor is one's making oneself into a thing" (ibid., p. 103).
Subjecting Smith's thoughts to dialectical analysis led Hegel to conclude
that modern man is less independent, Jess self-sufficient than his primitive
ancestors. Though man is now less dependent on nature, he has become
more dependent on his fellow men. Yet even as he becomes more productive, the value of his labor declines. The worker "works at an abstract labor;
he wins much from nature. But this merely transforms itself into another
contingency. He can produce more, but this reduces the value?f hi;, I~b.or;
and in this he does not emerge from universal [i.e. abstract] relatIOns (Ibid.,

p. 138).

.
.
Next, Hegel showed how alienation in the workp.lace spllls.over I~to the
market place. The proliferation of goods and sefVIces combined With the
division and specialization of labor requires the introduction of money and
a monetary system to make the whole system operate. Smith's early

8 An alternative translation of this is found both in Avineri and in Plant.
G
This was a point that was well understood by a n~~bcr of J~t~;~:~:~~~~te~:~~
philosophers _ something they had deduced from the wnltng s of th
thinkers (See Plant 1983, pp. 17-24).

9:

I
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chapter, "Of the Origin and Use of Money," caught Hegel's eye. Smith
noted that the division of labor left the producers with a surplus of the
product they produced, while at the same time a "very small part of a man's
wants" was satisfied by the "produce of his own labor" (Smith 1776, p. 22).
The result was that "every man .. .lives by exchanging" (ibid.). However, this
creates new problems; for "when the division of labour first began to take
place, this power of exchanging must frequently have been very much
clogged and embarrassed in its operations" (ibid.). Consequently, money
was invented, exchange monetized, and "the society itself grows to be what
is properly a commercial society" (ibid.). In his earlier J ena Lectures, Hegel
took up Smith's scenario and expanded on it:
This manifold laboring at needs as things must likewise realize their
concept, their abstraction; their universal concept must become a
thing like them, but one which, qua universal, represents all needs;
money is this materially existing concept, the form of unity, or of the
possibility of all things needed .... Need and labor, elevated into this
universal, then form on their own account a monstrous system of
community and mutual interdependence in a great people; a life of
a dead body, that moves itself within itself, one which ebbs and
flows in its motion blindly, like the elements, and which requires
continual strict dominance and taming like a wild beast (Hegel
1979, p. 249).

In his later Jena Lectures, Hegel recognized that modern man's life is
contingent both on the desires of others for the things produced at his place
of work, as well as others production of the things that he requires. Driven
by the relentless search for profits, the capitalist system expands man's
actual needs; at the same time, it creates false needs, while failing to satisfy
these genuine human needs. "Needs are thereby diversified; each individual need is subdivided into several; taste becomes refined, leading to
further distinction. (In the production of gOOds a degree of) preparation is
demanded which makes the consumable thing ever easier to use. And so
that all the individual's incongruous aspects are provided for (e.g. cork,
corkscrew, candlesnuffer), he is cultivated as naturally enjoying them"
(Hegel 1983, p. 139). The production of these goods, to satisfy man's
growing needs, as well as the creation of false needs; leads to further
specialization and division of labor. At the same time, it also makes labor
more alienating. Again, the influence of Smith's commentary on the
dehumanizing effects of the division and speCialization of labor is clearly
seen in Hegel's remarks.
By the same token, however, he becomes - through the abstractness of labor - mOre mechanical, duller, spiritless. The spiri~ual
element, this fulfilled self-conscious life, becomes an empty domg.
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~he po:ver of the Self consists in a rich (all-embracing) comprehen-

SiOn; thiS power is lost. He can leave some work to the machine but
his own activity thereby becomes more formalized. His dull ~ork
constricts him to a single point, his work becomes more consummate the more one-sided it becomes (ibid.).
M~reover, the specialized modern worker is exposed to three new threats

which were of little or no concern prior to this division of labor - the threat
of changing fashion, the threat of new technology, and the threat of
uncontrollable events in foreign countries.
In his later lena Lectures, Hegel began by examining the effects of
changing fashion on the workers and their livelihood. Here he was
el~borating on Smith's analysis, in his chapter "On the Natural and Market
Pnce of Commodities," of the effects of price fluctuations on "the component parts of price." There Smith had written: "The occasional and
temporary fluctuations in the market price of any commodity faJl chieflyon
those parts of its price which resolves itself into wages and profit" (Smith
1776, p. 59). An unanticipated increase in the demand for some goods
" augments the profits of the merchants" but "has no effect upon the wages
of the weavers" (ibid.). An unexpected decrease in demand not only
"reduces the profits of the merchants.... It sinks too the wages of the
workmen" (ibid.). Smith expanded on this issue in "Of the Produce of Land
which always affords Rent," Part I, of his chapter "Of the Rent of Land."
Im~roved agricultural productivity releases labor. from that .sector, and
Smith explored the diversion of workers into a rapidly expandmg produ~
tion of luxury goods. He also observed that "the poor, in order to ob~al~
food, exert themselves to gratify those fancies of the rich, and to obtal~ It
more certainly, they vie with one another in the cheapness and perfection
of their work" (ibid., p. 164).
.
As he explored this in more depth, Smith discovered that the production
. d'n the bowels of
o f these luxury goods "the fossils and minerals con tame I
.'
t
" for the nch IS
'
.
'.
th e earth the precious metals and the precIOus sones,
fundame~tally different from the production of other goods. Here scarcity
d
.
.
b educed or halted to
ommates over abundance so that productIOn mayer
h
meet the desires of the we;lthy. "With the greater part of rich people, t e
chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches" (ibid., ~.172). ~or
. h'
d ".
tly enhanced by Its scarCity,
th e flC the "ment" of any luxury goo IS grea
.
or by the great labour which it requires to collect any considera?l~ q)uaSntltyh
.
I s" {Ibid.. uc
of It, a labour which nobody can afford to pay but themse ve . h'd t'fied
ulence" whlc I en I
rare Iuxury goods bear the "decisive mar kSO f 0 P
,
for
.
Th d' to expand production
t h elf, owners as particularly wealthy.
e nve
. on Sml'th's
'e
d Expandmg
profit, perverts production for genume human ne '
the pervercommentary Hegel in his Jenenser Realphilosophie II, foresees d r t'shes
,
"
I
ce the fads an Ie I
SlOns of modern marketing, planned obso escen ,
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which burst on the scene with increasing frequency, and the like.
Yet this multiplicity creates fashion, mutability, freedom in the use
offorms. These things - the cut of clothing, style of furniture - are
not permanent. Their change is essential and rational, far more
rational than staying with one fashion and wanting to assert something as fixed in such individual forms. The beautiful is subject to
no fashion; but here there is no free beauty, only charming beauty
which is the adornment of another person and relates itself to [yet]
another, a beauty aimed at arousing drive, desire, and which thus
has a contingency to it (Hegel 1983, p. 139).
Smith noted, however, that changing fashion was not the only circumstance which jeopardized the jobs of workers; in fact the division of labor,
itself the source of expanding output, increased production specifically by
replacing workers with machine technology. Smith cited "three different
circumstances .. .in consequence of the division of labor" which increased
production, the ~hird of which was: "the invention of a great number of
machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the
work of many (Smith 1776, p. 7). Note here that the invention and
introduction of machinery not only "facilitates" but also "abridges" labor.
Machinery improves labors' productivity, but machinery is also laborsaving. Yet what Smith casually referred to as "the abridgement of labor"
not only saves labor, but robs some workers (the abridged laborers) of their
livelihood. Furthermore, these inventions also simplify labor, reducing the
skill required to perform productive tasks. An important consequence of
this labor simplifying is the reduction of the skilled workers' high income
down to the much lower wages of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. In
Hegel's view, this adds to the burdens of labor, has further seriously
alienating consequences for the worker. Machine technology replaces
skilled labor and renders such workers' skills either less valuable or altogether valueless, thereby destroying the skilled worker's "possibility of
sustaining his existence." Moreover,
similar incessant is the search for ways of simplifying labor, inventing o~h~r ma~hin~s, etc. In the individual's skill is the possibility of
sustammg hIS eXIstence. This is subject to all the tangled and
complex contingency in the [social] whole. Thus a vast number of
people are conde~ned to a labor that is totally stupefying, unhea.Jthy,. unsafe-m ,:orkshops, factories, mines, etc.-shrinking
theIr skills. And entIre branches of industry, which supported a
larg~ class of p~opl~, go dry all at once because of [changes in]
fashlo~ or a fall III pnces due to inventions in other countries, etc.and thIS huge population is thrown into helpless poverty. (Hegel
1983, pp. 139-140).
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. H.ere we see one more problem faced by the worker, for his job and
~lvehhood are not only dependent on events in his own country, but are also
mfluenced by events in foreign lands as well. Here Hegel is probably
elaborating Smith's commentary on the role of exports as a "vent for surplus
production." In Hegel's 1803-1804 Jena Lectures, he remarks that division
and specialization of labor has turned workers' jobs into "a [matter of] blind
dependence, so that some far-off operation often suddenly cuts off the
whole labor of a whole class of men who were satisfying their needs by it, and
makes it superfluous and useless" (Hegel 1979, p. 248).10 The specialized
worker thus finds himself, his livelihood, and his job threatened from three
sources: changing fashion may render his product obsolete; new technology may "abridge" his labor; and events in foreign countries, such as new
inventions or changing tastes, may make his work "redundant and useless."
Yet thi~, is not the end of it, for Hegel remarks later that "factories,
manufacturing, base their subsistence on the misery of one class" (Hegel
1983, p. 166). The misery of the working class, for Hegel, is a two-fold
phenomena-the alienating, dehumanizing misery of the workplace and
the miserable poverty resulting from low income earned at work. Smith,
himself, in his chapter entitled, "Of the Expenses of the Sovereign or
Commonwealth," gives a vivid description of this second form of misery, the
consequences of the unequal distribution of income which arises from
private ownership of property: "Wherever there is great property, there is
great inequality. For every rich man, there must be at least five hundred
poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many"
(Smith 1776, p. 670). Notice that Smith's three great original economic
classes _ labor, capitalist, and landowner- are resolved byprivat~ prope.rty
into only two classes-the few rich and the many poor. A defimng
institutional characteristic of capitalism is private property. Howe~e~,
Smith saw the unequal distribution of wealth as a potent source of CIVil
disorder: "The affluence ofthe rich excites the indignation of the poor, who
are often driven bywant, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions"
(ibid. ).
Smith concluded that this unequal distribution is, in fact, the reason that
government was originally instituted: "The acquisition of v~l~able and
extensive property, therefore requires the establishment of Civil government" (ibid.). Thus in Smith's view, private proper~y, or more acc~rately
the unequal distribution of private property, reqUires the formation of
government. But the unequal distribution of wealth which gives rise to the
,
I . . "I thus happens that a far-away
10, Avineri and Plant give this alternative trans
' dst hroug h
h h atlon.
h'th nlosalis/ied Ihelrnee
operation often affects awholc classofpcoplc",: 0 avc I cr d
I "(Avineri 1972, p, 93
it, all of a sudden it limits (their work), makes It redundant an usc ess
and Plant 1983, p, 211),
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need for government, influences the very purpose of government. "Civil
government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality
instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have
property against those who have none at all" (ibid., p. 674). This last
commen t recalls Sm ith' s proposi Hon in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (1766
version): "Till there be property, there can be no government, the very end
of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from the poor" (Smith,
1978, p. 404).
Hegel's commentary on the unequal distribution of wealth and income
most clearly reflects Smith's analysis of this consequence of private property. Moreover, Hegel recognizes the role played by another, uniquely
capitalist-institution, which Smith had also analyzed-the large scale jointstock company. Smith was impressed with the ability of the joint-stock
company to attract large fina~cial capital, because of the limited liability
aspect of such firms (see Smith 1776, pp. 699-700). Hegel recasts Smith's
analysis of the unequal distribution of wealth and income, introducing
Smith's comments on the joint-stock company, to identify the role played by
such firms in the distribution process. In Hegel's words:
The contrast [between] great wealth and great poverty appears: the
poverty for which it becomes impossible to do anything; [the]
wealth [which], like any mass, makes itself into a force. The
amassing of wealth [occurs] partly by chance, partly through universality, through distribution. [It is] a point of attraction, of a sort
which casts its glance far over the universal, drawing [everything]
around itself - just as a greater mass attracts smaller ones to itself.
To him who hath, to him is given. Acquisition becomes a manysided system, profiting by means or ways that the smaller business
cannot employ. In other words, the highest abstraction of labor
pervades that many more individual modes and thereby takes on an
ever-widening scope. This inequality between wealth and poverty,
this need and necessity, lead to the utmost dismemberment of the
will, to inner indignation and hatred. This necessity, which is the
complete contingency of individual existence, is at the same time its
sustaining substance. State power enters and must see to it that
each sphere is supported. It goes into [various] means and remedies, seeking new markets abroad, etc., [but] thereby making
things all the more difficult for one sphere, to the extent that state
power encroaches to the disadvantage of others (Hegel 1983, p.
140).
. Further on, Hegel continues and expands on these remarks concerning
the growth of government, again clearly drawing on Smith's commentary:
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It is universal w~alth and universal necessity.... [This system]
condemns a multitude of people to a raw life, to stultification in
labor a~d to poverty - in order to let others amass wealth and [then]
to take It fro.m theI?' The inequality of wealth is accepted if heavy
taxes are levied; this lessens envy and averts the fear of distress and
robbe~. Aris~ocrats, who pay no taxes, stand in the greatest danger
of losmg their wealth through violence, since they cannot find
reconciliation by sacrificing it (ibid., p. 145).
At ~he end of this commentary, Hegel adds this curt remark, directly from
Smith "The government wastes its wealth, saves nothing" (ibid.).
Using Smith's Wealth of Nations, Hegel discerned the contradictory
characteristics of capitalism, most importantly, the negative, alienating
aspects of labor in such an economic system. Much of Hegel's commentary
in his early Jena Lectures foretells Marx's analysis in his Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts. When we remember how impressed Hegel was
with Sir James Steuart's theory of the statesman, and the need for state
intervention into the economic sphere; it would be reasonable to conclude
that Hegel too would call for government intervention into the economy.
Yet, instead, we see the profound impact of Smith's influence on Hegel's
thought. For Hegel, the state must minimize its interference into the
economic sphere, "civil society." In Hegel's words:

Freedom of Commerce: interference must be as inconspicuous as
possible, since commerce is the field of arbitrariness. The appearance of force must be avoided; and one must not attempt to salvage
what cannot be saved, but rather employ the suffering classes in
other ways. [The state power] is the universal overseer; th.e
individual is merely entrenched in individuality. C?mmerce ~s
certainly left to its own devices- but with the sacnfice o~ th~S
generation and the proliferation of poverty, poor-taxes, and IOStItutions. Yet the [social] substance is not only this regulatory law: as
the power that sustains individuals. Rather, i~ i~ itself productIve
[of a] great benefit, the benefit of the whole (Ibid., p. 140).

Inv~sible ~and.
~~n

Clearly, Hegel is employing Smith's concept of the
It is
Smith's Invisible Hand, guiding each individual's pursUit of hiS
.selfinterest to do what is required in society's best interest, that IS Itself
productive of a great benefit the benefit of the whole." Here, for the first
time we find Hegel working ;oward the concept of the Cunning of ~eason,
,
. . I
't'ngs The Plllioso']Jhy
a concept that plays an important role 10 hiS ater wn I ,
.
of History and The Philosophy of Right. How, then, is Smith'S IOfluence
expressed in Hegel's later works?
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III. SMITH'S INVISIBLE HAND AND HEGEL'S CUNNING OF
REASON

Hegel's Philosophy of Right concerns the progress of Reason or Spirit in
society, that is, the domain of objective spirit, and explains the development
of law, morality, and ethical life. Since Hegel came to understand the
progress of Reason to be a process of self-recognition whereby the objectification of law, morality, and ethical life are discovered to be dimensions
of Reason, Smith's conception of the Invisible Hand at work in the market
system that brings about a result additional to that involved in individuals'
private purposes was attractive to Hegel. Thus, since much of his conception of civil society in the Philosophy ofRight emerged from his earlier Jena
work in which Smith's thinking was absorbed and developed in Hegel's
idealist metaphysics, it is arguable that the notion of the Invisible Hand in
some fashion underlies its counterpart in Hegel's work, the Cunning of
Reason.
Much of the Philosophy of Right justifies this supposition. In the realm of
ethical life (Sittlichkeit), the third and key part of the Philosophy ofRight for
the consideration of economic life, Hegel focuses in large part on civil
society. He characterized it as the sphere of self-interest, premised on a
system of needs, whose study in a system of production is the science of
political economy (Hegel 1942, paragraph 188. All citations refer to the
paragraph numbers in the Knox translation.):
Political economy is the science which starts from this view of needs
and labour but then has the task of explaining mass-relationships
and mass-movements in their complexity and their qualitative and
quantitative character. This is one of the sciences which has arisen
out of the conditions of the modern world. Its development affords
the interesting spectacle [as in Smith, Say, and Ricardo] of thought
working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the
outset and extracting therefrom the simple principles of the thing,
the Understanding effective in the Thing and directing it. It is to
find reconciliation here to discover in the sphere of needs this show
of rationality lying in the thing and effective there (ibid., 189).
The fundamental accomplishment of this science, Hegel asserts, is to
demonstrate that rationality of civil society that itself springs from individuals' pursuit of their own self-interest. Thus "in the course of the actual
attainment of selfish ends ... there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is
interwoven with the livelihood, happiness and rights of all" (ibid., 183).
Hegel, then, shows the imprint of his study of Steuart and Smith and
accordingly derives his basic understanding of civil society from E~glish
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political economy.
Indeed, in a passage reminiscent of Smith's famous remark about the
butcher, bre,:er, and ba~e: in The Wealth oiNations (see Smith 1776, p.14),
Hegel explams the actIvIty of self-interest in terms of a transcendent
rationality, in keeping with his own conception of the progressive selfrealization of Reason: "The fact that I must direct my conduct by reference
to others introduces here the form of universality. It is from others that I
acquire the means of satisfaction and I must accordingly accept their views.
At the same time, however, I am compelled to produce means for the
satisfaction of others. We play into each other's hands and so hang together.
To this extent everything private becomes social" (Hegel, 1942, 192A). The
emergence of a rationality within the pursuit of individual self-interest, that
is, is expressly a matter of each individual's association of self-interest with
the interest of others. Self-interest in effect cannot be solely understood in
terms of single individuals, since its activity makes other individuals'
interests internal to its own expression. In a general system of needs
characterized by the science of political economy, this demonstrates the
higher purpose inherent in civil society.
Where men are thus dependent on one another and reciprocally
related to one another in their work and the satisfaction of their
needs, subjective self-seeking turns into a contribution to the
satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. That is to say, by a
dialectical advance, subjective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that :ach
man in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account IS eo
ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of everyone else
(ibid., 199).
This might indeed seem to be Hegel's reading ofSmith~s Invisib.le Hand
account of the unintended effects of the individual's pursUIt ofself-mterest.
Smith's argument concludes regarding the self-seeking individual:
He generally, indeed, neither intends to proronote the publi~ interest, nor knows how much he is promotmg It. By. prefernng th.c
support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he mtends only ~IS
.
.
h t· d stry in such a manner as ItS
own security; and by dlrectmg tam u
..
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends o.nIY.h.lS own gam,
and he is in this, as in many other cases, I:d by ~n mVlsl?le hand to
promote an end which was no part of his mtentJOn (SmIth 1776, p.

423).
..
H d· t work in the activity of selfThus where for Smith an InVIsible an IS a
.
I
f selfinter~st for Hegel a "dialectical advance" similarly dnves thct p a~~oy the
interest'to a higher result. Accordingly, while Hegel does no em
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notion of the Cunning of Reason in the Philosophy of Right, that notion
nonetheless seems operative there in a fashion reminiscent of Smith's
notion of the Invisible Hand.
Moreover, that the notion of the Cunning of Reason appears earlier in
Hegel's writing-in the "Introduction" to The Philosophy of Historysuggests that attention to it in its earlier context may illuminate Hegel's
discussion of economic life in the civil society in the Philosophy ofRight. The
"Introduction" presents Hegel's conception of history as the self-unfolding
of Reason as a rational process. The argument involving the Cunning of
Reason explains how the "means" of the historical process - the "needs,
passions, and interests" that are the "sole springs of action" are drawn into
the progressive development of Reason in history (Hegel 1956, p. 20).
Prefiguring the thinking of the Philosophy of Right with regard to the
treatment of civil society, Hegel asserts that "Nothing ... happens, nothing is
accomplished, unless the individuals concerned, seek their own satisfaction
in the issue" (ibid., p. 23).
Yet though "needs, passions, and interests" are the evident agents of the
historical process, their activi ty presupposes - and obscures - the progress
of Reason in history. Though the self-unfolding of Reason only gradually
becomes apparent as an increasing consciousness of Reason in history,
whose essence, for Hegel; is free development, "[t]he History of the world
is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom" (ibid., p.
19). Thus the particular purposes of individuals preoccupy their attention,
while Reason works out its development behind struggle and conflict: "It
is not the general idea that is implicated in opposition and combat, and that
is exposed to danger. It remains in the background, untouched and
uninjured. This may be called the cunning of reason- that it sets the
passions to work for itself, while that which develops its existence through
such impUlsion pays the penalty, and suffers the loss" (ibid., p. 33). In
addition, then, to the emphasis Hegel develops in the Philosophy of Right,
where implicit in the self-interest of individuals is the regard for others,
Hegel here emphasizes that the progressive movement of Reason in history
brings about a greater condition of freedom generally. Not only is the
interplay of self-interest productive of a social harmony in civil society that
suggests Smith's conception in The Wealth of Nations, but this good is
inc:easingly realized as the pro~ressive development offreedom in history.
Th.ls g~nera~ ~e:elopment o.f histOry, then, underlies the development of
obJ~ct,lVe S~I~lt III the domam ~f social life, adding a theory of history to
Smith s InvIsible Hand conception of social harmony.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hegel's notion of a "dialectical advance" whereby individual "subjective
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self-seeking" b~comes a "producing and earning for the enjoyment of
e~eryone else" IS absent in Smith's account of the Invisible Hand. Yet it is
faIr to argue that Smith's view is more a matter of Hegelian dialectical
d.evelopment. th~n. it ini~ially appears in its Scottish Enlightenment garb
Since t~ough IndIvI~uals self-interests are opposed, the successful pursuit
of self-Inte~est reqUIres that the individual transcend the immediacy of own
needs, to dIscover what would satisfy another in exchange. Moreover,
Hegel s complex concept of transcendence [aufgellOben J, which requires
both the overcoming and preservation of that which is transcended, also
seems to be atwork in Smith's Invisible Hand thinking. While the individual
must discover and address the self-interest of other individuals in the
marketplace, nonetheless it specifically remains a matter of the individual's
self-interest to do so. Thus a higher form of sociality emerges via the
contradictory activities of self-interested individuals, though that social
harmony the Invisible Hand creates still preserves the play of self-interest.
Though Smith's thinking can appear more dialectical than customarily
believed, the differences between Smith and Hegel remain significant, and
it should not be thought that the Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason
are essentially the same notion. In the first place, Hegel's famous comment
on the violence of Reason's development in history signals his departure
from Smith's more complacent Jate Renaissance thinking: History is "the
slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States,
and the virtue of individuals have been victimized" (ibid., p. 21). The
Cunning of Reason is not so much a matter of Reason's obscurity in the
events of history - a conception that itself does fit well with the Invisible
Hand - but a matter of Reason's unhesitating use of the "needs, passions,
and interest" as the means bywhich Reason develops,. however irration~1 i~
sacrifice of individuals and societies. This, surely, IS not part of SmIth s
vision since the Invisible Hand harmonizes and reconciles individuals' selfseeki~g to generate the happiest state of affairs possible. Secondly, Hegel's
conception of transcendence treats that which is preserved. in ~he ~vercom
ing of a past state of affairs quite differently than does ~mI.t~ m hl~ relat~d
thinking. For Smith, that is, self-seeking preserves the IlldIvld~al ~ntegnty
of the economic agent; while for He~el, indivi~uals' "s~bJectIve ~el:~
seeking" as often as not leads to theIr destru~tl?n. Thlr.dly, Sml~h.
metaphysical universe is essentially made up of indIVIduals, wh."e Hegel SIS
constituted by Reason itself. II This difference perhaps prOVIdes Hegel a
. conceptJOn
. of hIstOry,
.
.
t st to Smith
more dynamIC
III con ra
. . 'since
. . the
. .devel-,
opment of Reason is not limited by the necessity of maInt~IllIng mdlvlduals
integrity as agents in economic life. In thePhilo50plzyofRlglzt, finally, Hegel
.
fN
Deity and higher Being. The
11. Smith also made reference 10 the WIsdom 0 ature,.,
.
.
1·1 r b· g. ng thIS to our allenlJOn.
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sees it necessary to complement civil society in the domain of objective spirit
with Reason's manifestation in the State. Even in his defense offree trade,
Hegel is not reluctant to set out in initial schematic fashion the prerogatives
of State power in the economy:
At the other extreme to freedom of trade and commerce in civil
society is public organization to provide for everything and determine everyone's labour.... This interest invokes freedom of trade
and commerce against control from above; but the more blindly it
sinks into self-seeking aims, the more it requires such control to
bring it back to the universal. Control is also necessary to diminish
the dangers of upheavals arising from clashing interests and to
abbreviate the period in which their tension should be eased
through the working of a necessity of which they themselves know
nothing (Hegel 1942,236A).
Smith's notion of the limited responsibilities of the state is thus narrower
than Hegel's conception of a state as a further fulfillment of Reason than
is available in civil society. Accordingly, Hegel's dialectical method again
distinguishes his thinking from his Smith ian inheritance. Though he
learned his political economy in large part from Smith, he incorporated this
understanding of alienation and private property within a framework of his
own dialectical thinking. The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason
thus part ways in substantial fashion, despite their other similarities.
In conclusion it should be appreciated that the nature of Smith's influence on continental philosophy in the nineteenth century has not always
been well recognized. Yet a careful review of the development of Hegel's
ideas about civil society as they progressed from the Jena Lectures to
Hegel's mature writings reveals more fully the extent to which" Adam Smi th
is thus aufgellOben - both preserved and transcended - into the Hegelian
system" [Avineri, 0p. cit.]. Hegel turned to Smith for a deeper understanding of modern commercial and industrial life as it had progressed in the
most economically advanced nation of his time. Subjecting Smith's Wealth
ofNations to his own dialectical cri tique provided Hegel wi th a broader view
of human society-from economy to civil society-and the fundamental
forces at work in such a society - from the Invisible Hand to the Cunning of
Reason. Smith, then, occupies a more substantial place in nineteenth
century continental thought than has generally been believed, though this
role, in fundamental ways, departs from what has been traditionally associated with the Wealth of Nations.
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